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NOTES
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE PROPOSED
"SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES ACT"
Consumers, by definition, include us all. They are the
largest economic group in the economy, affecting and
affected by almost every public and private economic
decision. Two-thirds of all spending in the economy is
by consumers. But they are the only important group in
the economy who are not effectively organized, whose
views are often not heard ....
If consumers are offered inferior products, if prices
are eorbitant, if drugs are unsafe or worthless, if the
consumer is unable to choose on an informed basis, then
his dollar is wasted, his health and safety may be
threatened, and the national interest suffers.'
I. LMoMDUCToI
Consumer problems have long been a matter of public con-
cern. Two centuries ago Adam Smith proclaimed that "con-
sumption is the sole end and purpose of all production" and that
"the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far
as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer."
2
Most recently, three presidents have recognized the need for con-
sumer protection and programs.3 Even though government, by
1. 108 CONG. REC. 4263 (1962) (message from President Kennedy to Con-
gress concerning consumer protection programs).
2. A. SMITH, AN INQUiRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE WEALTH
OF NAToNs 625 (Modem Library ed. 1937).
3. See note 1 supra. In May, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Governor
of New York, stated: "I believe we are on the threshold of a fundamental
change in our popular economic thought, that in the future we are going to
think less about the producer and more about the consumer." Barber, Govern-
ment and the Consumer, 64 MicH. L. Rrv. 1203 (1966), quoting THE PuBLic
PAPERS AND ADRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. RoosavE.T 639, 645 (1938). President
Johnson in his message to Congress states:
[Flor far too long, the consumer has had too little voice and
too little weight in government.
As a worker, as a businessman, as a farmer, as a lawyer or doc-
tor, the citizen has been well represented. But as a consumer, he
has had to take a back seat That situation is changing. The con-
sumer is moving forward. We cannot rest content until he is in the
front row, not displacing the interests of the producer, yet gaining
equal rank and representation with interest ....
What is new is the concern for the total interest of the con-
sumer, the recognition of certain basic consumer rights; the right
to choose, the right to be heard.
110 CONG. RIc. 1958, 1960 (1964).
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enacting consumer protection legislation, is exhibiting increasing
awareness of the consumer and his problems, these problems,
because of the magnitude of modern day business, are presently
greater and more compelling than ever before.4
The modern economic structure, the deception inherent in
sophisticated means of modern merchandising, and the con-
tinuous denial of information necessary to make wise purchases
make it difficult for the individual consumer to protect himself
against fraudulent business practices. While there is evidence
that these deceptive practices are most commonly encountered by
the elderly and the uneducated poor, the problems are by no
means foreign to the better educated and the wealthy.5 In illus-
trating the magnitude of this problem, which has been estimated
to cost the purchasing public untold millions of dollars each
year through fraud,6 a congressional report stated that "[o]ne
billion dollars was mentioned most often as the annual cost of
quackery in the United States."1
7
"Among the various types of fraudulent schemes are activities
running from all the way of [sic] outright fraud and potent
misrepresentation to mere attempts to catch the consumer off
balance."'8 Among these, the most prevalent types of consumer
fraud schemes are: 9 bait and switch,'0 multilevel distributor-
4. See Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1203
(1966).
5. Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does the Con-
sumer Have a Private Remedy?, 1968 DuxE L.J. 831 (1968); Note, Trans-
lating Sympathy for the Deceived Consmers Into Effective Programs for
Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966). This writer interviewed approxi-
mately twenty-five doctors, lawyers, and college graduates of all ages and
discovered that nearly all had been affected by some type of deceptive scheme.
6. Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Consmner Fraud Act, 54
IOwA L. Rnv. 319 (1963).
7. SUBcommiTTEE ON FRAUDS AND MISREPRESENTATION AFFECTING THE
ELDERLY, 89TH CONG 1ST SESS., REPORT ON FRAUtS AND DEcEPTIONS AFFEcr-
ING THE ELDERLY 8 (Comm. Print 1965).
8. Address by Douglas R. Carlson, The National Association of Attorneys
General Consumer Protection Conference, Louisville, Kentucky, Oct. 6-7, 1969
(unpublished manuscript in the office of the South Carolina Attorney General).
9. All of the consumer fraud schemes described in notes 10-19 infra are
taken from a report distributed by the South Carolina Attorney General's
office.
10. Bait and Switch. Bait and switch usually takes the form of an unbe-
lievable bargain, a brand named item offered at a low price, or merchandise
offered at special savings over the normal prevailing market price. When the
customer arrives to avail himself to the advertised item, the salesman may
tell him that the advertised item is either "sold out' or "no good." After thus
explaining away the absence of the advertised item or after disparaging the
advertised item, the salesman will try to sell the customer a substitute item at
a much higher price. Thus, the customer has been switched to buying a higher
priced item than he intended to buy.
[Vol. 22
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ships," car leasing,' 2 free gift come-on, 13 fictitious discounts,"4
home improvement and repair swindles,15 phoney contests, 0 oral
guarantees,17 lands in the sun,' s and correspondence and trade
11. Multilevel Distributorships. The concept of the multilevel distributorship
is probably one of the most prevalent consumer frauds in the nation today.
Most companies using the multilevel distributorship scheme require the cus-
tomer to purchase a certain amount of the product they are selling along with
the distributorship title they get by paying the purchase price. Thus, the
company is actually giving the customer some merchandise for his money. The
company usually paints exaggerated pictures of the earning potential of the
"distributor" by informing them that they can make large amounts of money
by signing up other people as "distributors." The problem with this type of
sales company is that they emphasize the sale of positions with the company
rather than a product itself. The end result is similar to that of a chain letter
in that the people that buy in on the lower levels may well get their money
back, or even make a profit, but the people that buy in at the end of the
scheme, just before the saturation level is reached, all stand to lose their
money.
12. Car Leasing. The general pattern of this type of consumer fraud is to
contact the owners of small businesses, such as service stations and automobile
repair shops, and attempt to sell them a leasing brokerage for an application
fee of $500. Companies selling this type of car leasing broker's agreement will
usually promise the potential broker a substantial return on his money by
agreeing to act as their local agent in their soon-to-be-found car leasing busi-
ness. As soon as the brokers' fee is paid, the company is never heard from
again.
13. Free Gift Come On. "Tell me who was buried in Grant's Tomb, and
win a prize." Then the telephone solicitor springs the trap: you must buy
something to get the "free gift" This is also done by the mailing of materials
offering free gifts if you will just come in and pick them up. The free gift is
usually used simply as thd inducement to get the potential customer to listen
to the sales pitch of the door-to-door salesman, or to come into the place of
business of the advertising merchants.
14. Fictitious Discounts. A fictitious discount is, for example, an item
marked, "Regular Price $60, now only $30." Such an item may sell regularly
for $30 or less, and the price has been fraudulently inflated to promote the
sale by making it seem like a bargain with the use of the phoney discount.
15. Home Improvement and Repair Swindles. This type of consumer fraud
usually involves a stranger who appears unsolicited at the door offering to do
such home repairs as inspecting and repairing the roof, asphalting the drive-
way, installing lightning rods, waterproofing the basement, clearing septic
tanks or sewers, roof painting, furnace repairs, and interior construction. These
activities are all very common consumer frauds and should immediately arouse
the suspicions of all informed consumers. The men involved in this type of
work usually do their work quickly for large sums of money and then quietly
disappear, never to be located when their work is found to be faulty.
16. Phoney Contest. A typical example of this type of fraudulent practice is
an ad asking the reader to send in a card to win a free prize. Such contests are
usually run to get the names of prospective purchasers of the company's
products. In some cases, the prizes may never be given or if they are, there
may suddenly be some sort of an expense involved.
17. Oral Guarantees. The typical high pressure salesman will try to talk a
prospective customer into making a purchase by making all sorts of glowing
statements and guarantees about the merchandise. However, when the contract
is examined, it may be found that none of the guarantees are in writing and
that there is even a provision stating that no oral statements, representations,
or guarantees made by the salesman are valid.
18. Lands in the Sun. The selling of off-site land in other states is especially
attractive to older people or people approaching retirement age. Quite often
a brochure will be received in the mail pointing out a glowing picture of a
1970) NoTs
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schools swindles.10 Since the above list is by no means inclusive,
it is apparent that any legal means used to curtail consumer
fraud schemes must be both comprehensive and flexible.
II. Commow LAw TEOHNIQuSE
At common law unfair or deceptive business practices were
dealt with in civil actions brought by competitors and individual
consumers against defrauding merchants. 20 A deceived buyer
might bring an action for deceit against a seller who had falsely
advertised a product.21 In order to recover in deceit, the con-
sumer was, however, required to show that he had reasonably
relied on a misrepresentation of fact, knowingly made by a mer-
chant with the intent to deceive. 22 In addition, the consumer had
to show that a verifiable fact had been misrepresented and that
the representation was not privileged as "mere puffing."23 The
difficulties of establishing an intent to deceive, mislead, or con-
vey a false impression and proving reasonable reliance on the
misrepresentation made this common law remedy inadequate to
protect the consumer.24 Modern developments in the law have,
however, made it easier for the consumer to utilize deceit actions.
Approximately eighteen states have held that a cause of action
can be founded upon innocent misrepresentations, with neither
scienter nor negligence on the part of the defendant, if the
representation was made to induce a business transaction and
was relied upon by the plaintiff to his damage. Furthermore,
many states have taken a pro-consumer approach to the fact-
opinion distinction in deceit actions.
25
home on an attractive lot site in a far away state. Usually this can be pur-
chased for a small down payment and so much a month. On responding to this
brochure, the consumer may well be invited to a dinner party at which he is
shown many glamorous movies of this so-called land development and subjected
to very subtle but high pressure salesmanship.
19. Correspondence and Trade Schools. While there are many legitimate
trade and correspondence schools that give their students their money's worth
in education and training, there are those that do not. Some of these so-called
schools are primarily concerned with simply collecting fees. They give little
regard to giving the student the proper training for the proposed occupation.
20. State Consumer Protection: A Proposal, 53 IowA L. REv. 710, 712
(1967); see Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAv.
L. REv. 1005, 1016 (1967).
21. Bohlem, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HA~Iv.
L. REv. 733 (1929).
22. W. PROSSER, ToRTs, § 100-05 (3d ed. 1964).
23. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 202 (rev. ed. 1948).
24. See Note, STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION: A PROPOSAL, 53 IOWA L. RFEv.
710 (1967) ; Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud
Act, 54 IOWA L. Rzv. 319 (1968).
25. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 102 (3d ed. 1964); see, e.g., Tott v. Duggan, 199
Iowa 238, 200 N.W. 411 (1924); New England Foundation Co. v. Elliott A.
[Vol. 22
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Misrepresentations, at common law, also gave rise to equitable
actions for rescission of contract so long as the parties could be
returned to their original positions. 26 The consumer was, how-
ever, required to overcome the same difficulties that hindered an
action for deceit and, in addition, show that the representation
was not privileged as "mere puffing."2 7 Am action for rescission
would lie if the misrepresentation was either intentional or
innocent and material .
2
The common law action for breach of warranty was also avail-
able to consumers to secure redress for injury resulting from
deceptive business practices.29 But, the buyer had to surmount
obstacles similar to those present in deceit actions, such as puff-
ing, reliance on a factual representation, privity of contract, and
the parole evidence rule.80 Here again, the law is now changing,
and the obstructions to recovery are not as great as they once
were.81 Common law breach of warranty actions have been
superseded by statutory enactments such as the Uniform Com-
mercial Code which will be discussed in part III.
Apart from the purchaser, the class of persons most clearly
subject to injury from false and misleading advertising consists
of competing firms whose trade may be diverted by the mis-
representation.3 2 At common law, competitors could bring civil
actions against unethical merchants for utilizing trade practices
which mislead consumers. The availability of such a remedy was
limited, however, because proof of special damages was required.
If the consumer benefited from an action brought by a com-
Watrous Inc., 306 Mass. 177, 27 N.E.2d 756 (1940). No South Carolina cases
were found on this point.
26. 5 S. WILIUSTON, CONTRACTS §§ 145-55 (rev. ed. 1937).
27. 1 S. WlLLISToN, SALES § 202 (rev. ed. 1948).
28. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACts § 471(1) (1932); RESTATRMENT OF RE TI-
TuTIoN, §§ 8, 28, 55 (1936).
29. 1 WILisToN, SALEs, §§ 178-226 (rev. ed. 1948); Note, Advertising and
the Buyer's Remedies, 6 VAND. L. REv. 376 (1953).
30. Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L.
REv. 1005 (1967).
31. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P2d 409 (1932), afI'd per
curiam on rehearing 15 P.2d 118 (1932); see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
32. These common law actions by competitors were designed to protect com-
petitors from unfair business practices of their fellow businessmen and, if
effective, ultimately to protect consumers by deterring these practices. The
most common actions of this nature were disparagement, false advertising, and
trade symbol infringement. Stringent requirements had to be met in order to
recover in several of these actions; therefore, many losses caused by unfair or
deceptive practices were not compensated and further violations were not
discouraged. Dole, The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Another Step
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petitor, it was only indirectly and actually afforded the con-
sumer no recourse against an unethical merchant.38 Conse-
quently, while this area of law is important, it is beyond the
scope of this article.
Most of the foregoing common law civil actions require the
consumer to retain a private attorney, which means that legal
fees exceeding the consumer's losses may be incurred in efforts
to obtain restitution. Under these circumstances, many defrauded
consumers will not institute legal proceedings; therefore, the
existing legal sanctions neither prevent nor discourage fraudu-
lent schemes. In many instances fraudulent operators carefully
avoid cheating individuals out of large sums of money, because
they realize that a person who is bilked out of a small amount
of money is usually not going to pay a lawyer to have his money
refunded. Thus, the only cases which lawyers handle are those
brought either by the unusual individual who will pay more
than the amount of his claim in order to see justice done or by
those defrauded out of amounts large enough to justify expendi-
tures for legal services. The number of consumers who have no
redress because of prohibitive legal costs constitute the vast
majority. 4 Even if a consumer does find it worthwhile to obtain
a judgment, the defrauding seller may lack the assets to pay or
may flee the jurisdiction.
The final factor which must be considered when discussing
consumer protection at common law is the ancient doctrine of
caveat empto4r which often acted as a bar to consumer recovery.
Under this doctrine no actionable misrepresentation was possible
if the parties were dealing at arms length,36 had equal means of
obtaining information, and were equally qualified to judge the
value of the property sold.87 The last few decades have, however,
witnessed a marked change in the general attitude of the courts
toward discarding the doctrine33 But, even though the doctrine
33. See note 59 infra.
34. Note, Translating Sympathy for the Deceived Conisumers into Effective
Programs for Protectio,'114 U. PA. L. Rsv. 395, 409 (1966).
35. The magnitude of the doctrine can be illustrated by the following state-
ment: "Not until the nineteenth cenury did judges discover that caveat emptor
sharpened wits, taught self-reliance, made a man-an economic man-out of
the buyer, and served well its two masters, business and justice." Hamilton,
The Anciett Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1186 (1931).
36. Burwash v. Ballou, 230 IlL 34, 82 N.E. 355 (1907).
37. Carpenter v. Hamilton, 18 Cal. App. 2d 69, 62 P.2d 1397 (Dist. Ct. App.
1936).
38. Seavey, Caveat Emptor As of 1960, 38 TEXs L. REv. 439 (1960). South
Carolina has long recognized that a sound price warrants a sound commodity
Vol. 2
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NOTs
of caveat emptor has been largely abandoned by the courts, the
prior mentioned impediments to consumer actions have destroyed
any hope of effective consumer common law remedies.
It is apparent that more flexible remedies must be
available to stop the deceptive practice before substan-
tial injury is done to the consumer. The efforts of pri-
vate and governmental organizations to warn the public
about deceptive practices axe absolutely necessary, but
an approach which recognizes existing fraudulent prac-
tice and seeks to educate the consumer is not enough.
The main goal of law enforcement should be the elimi-
nation of deceptive practices. 9
III. STATUTORY LAW
A. PTinter's Ink Statute
As commerce and industry increased within the United States,
deceptive business practices also increased. Since the rigidity of
the common law remedies severely restricted their ability to
handle consumer problems, state legislatures slowly began to act
to fill the void.
In 1911, in response to efforts initiated within the advertising
industry, a model statute was drafted by the Piinter's Ivk maga-
zine to curb false or misleading advertising.40 This model statute
with some variations was adopted by all but three states.41 This
statute makes it a misdemeanor to advertise a representation that
is "untrue, deceptive, or misleading"; a violation is committed by
disseminating such an advertisement with the intent to sell mer-
chandise even though no sale is made.42 Prosecution under this
and has rejected the doctrine of caveat emptor in favor of caveat venditor.
See S.C. CoDE Axi. § 102-314 (Supp. 1966) and South Carolina Reporter's
Comments.
39. Saxbe, The Role of the Government in Consumer Protection: The Con-
sumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Office of the Ohio Attorney General,
29 Onio STATE L.J. 897, 909 (1968).
40. Comment' Untrue Advertising, 36 YALE L.J. 1155 (1927).
41. Note, State Cons u mer Protection: A Proposal, 53 IovA L. Rv. 710
(1967). The three states which have not passed a Printer's Ink Statute are:
Arkansas, Delaware, and New Mexico.
42. For the text of the model statute, see Comment, State Control of Bait
Advertising, 69 YALE LJ. 830, 831 (1960). South Carolina's version of the
statute does not use the words "untrue, deceptive, or misleading" and is
entitled "Making Intentionally Untrue Statements in Advertising." The South
Carolina statute reads as follows:
Any person who knowingly with intent to sell or in any wise
dispose of merchandise, securities, service or anything offered by
such person, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale of distribu-
tion or with intent to increase the consumption thereof, . . . pub-
1970]
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statute requires three elements of proof: (1) an intent to sell,
dispose of, or increase the consumption of goods, etc.; (2) the
placing before the public, with such intent, of any type of
advertising; and (3) the existence, in such advertising or repre-
sentation, of a fact which is untrue.
43
Because of the difficulty of proving criminal intent to adver-
tise falsely and the narrow judicial construction of the Printer's
Ink statutes by the courts,44 there have been few prosecutions
under this statute.45 In at least one case, People v. Glubo,46 the
court has expanded the interpretation of the Printer's Ink
Statute to include bait advertising. This case has been criticized
as being beyond the intent and scope of the statute. The Print-
er's Ink Statute was, furthermore, designed for relatively clear-
cut cases of misrepresentation of quality and will, therefore, not
serve as an effective vehicle for combating bait advertising.
47
In spite of the statute's limited flexibility, some courts have
followed Glubo.
48
The proposed Draft of the South Carolina Criminal Code
includes a section which deals specifically with bait advertising4 9
and involves provisions which are very similar to those included
in the proposed South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (to
be discussed in part VI). A person violates section 19-3 of the
Draft if he (1) makes use of any medium whatever, (2) to
facilitate a scheme or plan, (3) by which he offers (a) property
or (b) services, (4) with the intent not to sell or provide the
advertised commodity or service (a) at the price stated, (b) in a
quantity sufficient to meet reasonably expected demand, unless
lishes, disseminates, circulates or places before the public ... in
a newspaper or other publication ... an advertisement of any sort
regarding merchandise, securities, service or anything so offered to
the public which contains any assertion, representation or state-
ment of fact which is intentionally untrue shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-3 (1962).
43. Comment, Untrue Advertising, 36 Ymx L.J. 1155 (1927).
44. An advertisement lacking the intent to sell, such as one soliciting em-
ployees, have been excluded from the operation of the statute. State v. Car-
ruthers, 21 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. App. 1929).
45. A study of prosecutions under false advertising statutes showed clearly
that most jurisdictions have never used the statutes at all, and that only a few
have initiated more than a handful of prosecutions. Note, The Regulation of
Advertising, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1018 (1956). There have been no reported
cases under the South Carolina statute.
46. People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 186 N.Y.S2d 26, 158 N.E.2d 699 (1959).
47. Comment, State Control of Bait Advertising, 69 YALE L.J. 830 (1960).
48. See, e.g., Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 556, 190
N.Y.S.2d 977, 161 N.E.2d 197 (1968); State v. Jost, 241 A.2d 316 (Vt 1968).
49. S.C. ClaM -NL CODE, § 19-3, (Tent. Draft. 1970).
[Vol. 22
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss5/4
NoTws
he advertises limited quantities, or (c) at all. 0 The effect of
this section of the Proposed Draft of the Criminal Code would
be to make criminal a particular type of conduct for which the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act provides a civil
remedy.
B. Fase Pretense Statutes
The disadvantages of civil remedies have prompted many
states to enact penal statutes designed to protect purchasers from
fraudulent businessmen. False Pretense Statutes have made it a
crime to obtain money or property by false pretenses if the
transaction involves an express or implied false representation
of an existing fact (not a promise to perform some act in the
future) made with intent to defraud. The operation of such
deception must induce a transfer, and the actor must obtain
something of value from the person defrauded.5 1 South Carolina
has two statutes which are typical of False Pretense Statutes and
a wealth of decisions interpreting these statutes.
52
Criminal legislation alone does not, however, adequately fulfill
the demand for an effective public remedy for consumer frauds.
The general problems of proof53 encountered in enforcing crim-
inal statutes, the practical limitations of ad hoc enforcement, and
the restrictive interpretations given false pretense statutes by the
courts54 simply place too many impediments in the way of public
officials who attempt to prosecute the unethical businessman.
C. The Uniform ComnerciaZ Code
The Uniform Commercial Code has greatly expanded the con-
cept of warranty as it was known at common law and, in so
doing, has enhanced the possibilities of recovery for many con-
sumers.55 The U.C.C. alone, however, is not sufficient to give
consumers protection against unethical merchants,"8 because
many warranties can be disclaimed if certain requirements of
50. S.C. CIMINAL CODE, § 19-3, Commentary (Tent. Draft 1970).
51. Annot, 99 A.L.R2d 925 (1950).
52. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-366, 368 (1962) and the cases there cited.
53. 2 J. Bisuop., CR=MINAL LAW §§ 414-15 (9th ed. 1923).
54. Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 967 (1953). The
Ohio Attorney General reports that in his state only the most flagrant types
of consumer frauds and deceptions are reached by the criminal law. Saxbe, The
Role of the Govermnent in Cowiemer Protection: The Constmer Frauds and
Crimes Section of the Office of the Ohio Attoriwy General, 29 OHIO STATE
L.J. 897 (1968).
55. UxrrFon CoMrmacA CODE §§ 2-312 to -318.
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the Code are met5,7 and because the Code does not protect against
or prevent the initial consumer fraud.
The "unconscionable" section58 of the Uniform Commercial
Code affords the consumer another means of protection, but for
the aforesaid reasons and because of the need to hire an attorney,
this section is also ineffective in protecting the consumer.
As the sophistication of promotional techniques in-
creased, and with it the scope of the problems presented
by false and misleading advertising, the inadequacy of
existing common statutory law to deal with those prob-
lems became clear. With the development of major
multi-state marketing areas the desirability of uniform
standards suggested the possibility of federal regulation
designed to fulfill the need for comprehensive and
effective control.5 9
IV. FEDFUL LAw
The major federal agency concerned with this area of the law
is the Federal Trade Commission.60 The FTC was established in
1914 and is primarily concerned with advertising abuses. The
Commission is empowered to enjoin false advertising which (1)
constitutes an unfair method of competition, 6' (2) amounts to a
deceptive practice,62 or (3) is misleading in a material respect.
63
Even with these relatively broad powers, the FTC is limited in
its effectiveness.
The basic section 5 jurisdictional grant of power to proceed
against "unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce" was held by the
Supreme Court not to reach intrastate practices merely affecting
57. Umorom COMMERcL CODE § 2-316; Note, Warranty, Disclaimers &
Limitations of Remedy for Breach of Warranty Under the U.C.C., 43 BOSTON
U.L. Rnv. 343 (1963).
58. UNIFoRu COMIMcIAL CoDE § 2-302.
59. Note, Developments it the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HA.v. L. REv.
1005, 1019 (1967).
60. However, a 1961 survey showed that 33 of the 35 principal departments
and agencies of the federal government were involved in some activity that
protected or promoted consumer interest. Barber, Government and the Con-
suner, 64 MrcH. L. REv. 1203 (1966).
61. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended 15
U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1952).
62. Id.
63. 33 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 52(a), 55(a) (1) (1952).
Only advertisements of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics are subject to these
sections. If the advertisement is not includible in these categories, the Commis-
sion can only proceed against the advertisement as an "unfair method of com-
petition" or as a "deceptive practice."
[Vol. 22
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interstate commerce. 64 Further, the FTC's policy is to attack
only deceptive schemes which have national impact. The Com-
mission has stated its position to be:
The FTC's fight against consumer deception is di-
rected at gyp schemes that have an actual or potential
impact on the public, as distinguished from actions to
settle private controversies. In short, it has neither the
staff nor the money to tackle cases that do not have suf-
ficient public interes. 6 5
The FTC has long been plagued by a huge backlog of cases
and a resulting inordinate time lag between the filing of a for-
mal complaint and the issuance of a final cease and desist order
or a promise of voluntary compliance.66 Moreover, a great ma-
jority of deceptive practices are conducted at the local level, and
a single agency at the national level cannot adequately handle
the vast number of consumer complaints. The diverse nature of
deceptive practices and their tendency to vary with geography
and population density make coordinated national regulation
undesirable. The FTC has recognized that it lacks the man-
power and resources to deal adequately with local deceptive
practices. While concentrating on deceptive trade practices of




A. Attomey GeneraZ Programs
Aside from accumulating a hotchpot of common law case
material dealing with the regulation of deceptive business prac-
64. FTC v. Bunte Bros. Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
65. Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1005, 1021 (1967), quoting from, FTC FIGaT BAcK-THE UNGENT AcT OF
SEF-DEFENSE.
66. Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission:
Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548 (1964); see, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4,
1970, at 11, col. 3.
67. See Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act,
54 IowA L. Rav. 319 n.29 (1968), quoting Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission.
[W]e at the Commission would like to see the 50 states of our
Union take potential business away from us by enacting more effec-
tive laws to prevent consumer deception and unfair competitive
business practices. By stopping such practices before they grow into
problems of interstate proportions, the need for federal action will
be minimized, and the people most directly affected will have a
telling voice in deciding what constitutes unfairness and deception.
The more effective the states can be in nipping illegal schemes in
the bud, the more energy the FTC can devote to dealing quickly
and effectively with problems of regional and national significance.
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tices, the states have adopted a staggering number of statutes
noteworthy for their ad hoc and piecemeal approach to the
problems of advertising control and for their lack of enforce-
ment.08 Mounting concern over the greatly increasing numbers
of complaints received concerning deceptive business practices
coupled with the phenomenal growth of promotional efforts has,
however, catalized state action to protect the consumer.
In 1957 the Attorney General of New York, acting under vari-
ous state statutes, established the first state bureau of consumer
frauds and protection.6 Following New York's lead, states
began to enact consumer protection legislation and in some cases
to establish a program within the office of the Attorney General
to handle consumer complaints. Presently all but fourteen states
have either an Attorney General's Program or legislation di-
rected to the protection of the consumer.
70
Since 1960, state regulation of deceptive trade practices has
substantially increased through the passage of civil remedial
statutes enforced statewide by the Attorney General and imple-
mented in many instances by specialized divisions within the
Attorney General's office created to deal exclusively with con-
sumer law problems. Shifting the burden of consumer protec-
tion to statewide agencies has led to more effective enforcement.
A statewide organization can more readily assess the most effec-
tive means of halting widespread fraudulent practices and also
operate more effectively because of larger staffs.71
68. Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 1021 (1956).
69. See Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Conmer Fraud Act,
54 IOWA L. REv. 319 (1968).
70. The states without an Attorney General's Program or legislation are:
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Of this number, four (Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, and Wyoming) will have some type of consumer legislation intro-
duced at the next session of the legislature. Two states (Louisiana and Mis-
sissippi) had consumer protection legislation defeated in committee in the last
session of the legislature. One state, Nebraska, reports that it has adequate
consumer legislation, but it lacks a centralized enforcement procedure and staff.
Among Nebraska's arsenal of consumer legislation is the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act and the statutes on unordered merchandise. Even states
without consumer legislation recognize the need for such legislation or attorney
general program. "This problem is becoming increasingly more important to
the Attorney General and to the officials where the public's interest and pro-
tection are concerned." Letter from Marshall G. Bennett, Special Assistant
Attorney General, State of Mississippi to the South Carolim Law Review,
Aug. 5, 1970.
The South Carolina Law Review expresses its appreciation to the Attorney
Generals of the above mentioned states for their cooperation in making this
Note possible.
71. Note, Translating Sympathy for the Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rv. 395 (1966).
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State Consumer Bureaus operating out of the Attorney
General's office may exist either with or without enabling
legislation.7 2 Most bureaus have been active in two areas: (1)
coordination of local law enforcement efforts and (2) consumer
education; neither require legislation.73 The bureaus attempt to
increase consumer awareness of deceptive practices and to im-
prove the consumer's ability to recognize such, activities through
informational programs, pamphlets, films, newspapers, radio,
and television.74 The Attorney General of Maryland states that
there are four functions of his Consumer Protection Division:
(1) mediation, (2) legislation, (3) education, and (4) investiga-
tion.7 5 By performing these functions, the division is able to
combat effectively deceptive trade practices on a statewide front.
B. Conoumer Protection Statutes
There are several types of civil statutes which give the Attor-
ney General authority to protect consumers from false advertis-
ing and unfair trade practices. The first of these is the False
Advertising and Unfair Trade Practices Act which was pat-
terned after the 1963 New York False Advertising Law. 6 There
has been little widespread acceptance of this act, because it does
not give the Attorney General investigative powers, authority
to seek an injunction, power to make rules or to accept an assur-
ance of discontinuance, or give the court authority to order
restitution or appoint a receiver.
77
72. In Ohio there is no specific statutory enabling authority for the Con-
sumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Office of the Ohio Attorney General.
Rather, it operates under the Attorney General's statutory power to act as
"chief law officer for the state and all its departments." OHio Rv. CODE AxN.
§ 109.02 (Page 1962); see note 38 supra.
73. Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAv. L. REv.
1005 (1967).
74. The North Carolina Attorney General's Office distributes a leaflet
entitled What Better Consumer Protection Means To You, which lists a "10
Point Buying Guide for Tar Heel Consumers." The Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Division distributes a quantity of cartoon leaflets warning the con-
sumer of deceptive schemes, such as bait and switch, and also informing the
consumer of consumer protection laws.
75. Burch, Maryland's "Action" Program in Consumer Protection, STATE
Gov. 161, 162 (Summer 1969). Mediation means to "get the money back as
promptly as possible for the citizen who has been cheated or defrauded." Legis-
lation means that needed consumer legislation is recommended to the legisla-
ture. Education simply means to educate the consumer as to deceptive schemes
and to applicable laws. Investigation means to investigate consumer complaints
and possible unethical and deceptive trade practices.
76. S. Douglas, State Attorney General Consumer Protection Programs,
June 1, 1968, (Unpublished Report in the Office of the South Carolina Attor-
ney General).
77. Id. at 27.
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The second consumer protection statute is the Conmaner Fraud
Law, which has been passed in approximately ten states.78
Fraudulent and deceptive merchandising is declared unlawful,
but the act specifically does not apply to television, radio, or
newspaper advertising or where the FTC or a state insurance
commissioner has jurisdiction. The Attorney General is given
the power to investigate probable violations of the statute pur-
suant to court order. Basic sanctions (to be discussed later) are
available to the court and the Attorney General via this act.
Connecticut, Georgia, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Texas have
adopted a third type of consumer protection act. This act,
entitled the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, was prom-
ulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. It defines terms, lists specific deceptive trade
practices, and authorizes injunctive relief. The main difference
between the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the
Consumer Fraud Act is that the former grants authority to
prosecute only to the consumer or merchant, whereas the latter
grants authority to the Attorney General7 9 This act should
greatly heighten the ability of an individual merchant or con-
sumer to halt a deceptive practice by means of an injunction and,
thereby, provide a greater measure of consumer protection.
The fourth and final consumer protection act is the FederaZ
Trade Commission Model Law for State Government. This act,
often referred to as the "Little FTC Act," was written by and
modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act. It was intro-
duced in the South Carolina General Assembly last year and had
a first reading on January 28, 1970.80 The bill passed the House,
but died in the Senate Finance Committee at the end of the
session. Presently, the bill is scheduled to be reintroduced in the
forthcoming session of the General Assembly. The "Little FTC
Act" will be discussed in part VI.
There are various basic sanctions that appear in the four acts
heretofore discussed which should provide the consumer with
adequate remedies for improper business conduct. While an in-
depth discussion of each type of consumer protection act is
beyond the scope of this note, these sanctions will be mentioned
78. Id. at 29.
79. Id. at 32.
80. The bill was introduced by Messrs. Hagins, Jenrette, McLendon, Sans-
bury, Kneece, Thomas E. Smith, Jr., Martin, Riley, Hartnett, James E. Moore,
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briefly. First, the Consumer Protection Division or the Attorney
General can accept an assurance of discontinuance of the decep-
tive practice, or an assurance of voluntary compliance with the
law. Second, the Attorney General or an individual can bring an
injunction to prohibit the unlawful act. Third, the Attorney
General may sue in a civil proceeding to recover a financial
penalty for a consumer law violation. Fourth, the court may
make such orders or judgments which may be necessary to
restore to any person any moneys or property lost because of a
violation of the consumer laws. Fifth, the court may terminate
the business affairs of a consumer law violator by dissolving a
corporation, or appointing a receiver to eliminate effectively the
profit derived from a fraudulent scheme."' (This list is a com-
posite of the sanctions available in all consumer fraud laws, and
each may not be available in every state.)
It should be apparent that the use of these types of regulatory
structures fills many of the gaps in the ineffective and inade-
quate regulation which existed under the traditional civil and
criminal enforcement schemes.
V7. .Self-Regulation and Legal Aid
Apart from government regulations, business has attempted to
control deceptive practices through self-regulation. The most
prominent such organization is the National Better Business
Bureau, which is a non-profit organization established by busi-
ness organizations to protect themselves and the consumer from
national advertising which is unfair, misleading, or fraudulent.
The Better Business Bureaus are financed entirely by member-
ship dues or subscriptions of business firms and organizations
operating on a national or regional level.82 In areas where the
Bureau is active, it can be helpful to consumers in some in-
stances; because of the private nature of the organization, it can,
however, do little against willful violators. This organization
has no official power to compel compliance with its requests,
nor does it have private sanctions to be used against non-com-
plying businesses. The only action available to the Bureau is to
81. See note 20 supra.
82. The South Carolina Better Business Bureau went out of business on
December 31, 1969. The functions of the BBB are now being conducted on a
limited scale by the Business Ethics Division of the Chamber of Commerce.
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request compliance and try to achieve the desired result through
persuasion and publicity.
8 3
Further aid for the consumer may come from Legal Aid So-
cieties, although the injured consumer must meet the Office of
Economic Opportunity's basic standards to be eligible for assist-
ance. The limited class which the Legal Aid Society is allowed
to serve, coupled with its united staff, prevents the society from
becoming an effective deterrent against fraudulent business
practices in the community. 4 Furthermore, the South Carolina
societies are working within the same inadequate legal frame-
work that hinders all consumer protection activities in the state
today because of the absence of needed legislation.
VI. Lrrn FTC AcT
To be effective, a civil regulatory statute should contain lan-
guage sufficiently flexible to encompass subtle deceptive mar-
keting and advertising schemes as they arise. This result is
achieved to a large degree by those statutes (not the "Little
FTC Act") which prohibit simply "deception and misrepre-
sentation" in the advertising or sale of merchandise. The desired
flexibility is, however, achieved to an even greater degree by
statutes, like the "Little FTC Act," which adopt the wording of
the FTC Act and bar "[u]nfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce." s This broad language not only has the advantage
of being able to deal with the many new and different types of
deceptive practices which may arise, but also enables the state to
employ the established body of FTC case law in the interpreta-
tion of the statute.80
83. See notes 33, 39 supra, and Note, State Consumer Protection: A Pro-
posal, 53 IowA L. REv. 710 n.36 (1967). See also Fair Practice Code for Ad-
vertising and Selling recommended by the Association of Better Business
Bureaus, Inc., COLVtn'IA CITY DIREcToRY, (1970); National Better Business
Bureau, Consumer Information Series No. 1 (undated).
84. The local Legal Aid Service Agency has two offices, one in Columbia
and one in Cayce. The Agency is staffed with four attorneys, four secretaries,
one investigator, tvo reggies, and one law student. Interview with Doug
Cannon, Attorney with Legal Aid in charge of consumer protection,
85. The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, H.2239, § 2(a) (1970);
see Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1952).
86. In explaining why South Carolina decided to try to enact the "Little
FTC Act" instead of one of the other consumer protection laws, John Bowen,
an Assistant Attorney General, said:
The "Little FTC Act" is broad enough to give us the flexibility
we need to attack the various unfair and deceptive practices that
are occurring and will occur in the future. Also, section 2(a) of
the Bill is the identical language used in the FTC Act which would
give us numerous judicial decisions and interpretations so as to
[Vol. 2"2
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The South Carolina bill to adopt the "Little FTC Act" defines
"person," "trade," and "documentary material" in terms which
are broad and comprehensive enough to effectuate the wide
application of the act. These definitions were designed to include
almost any attempt to induce a person to enter into an obligation
for goods or services; an aotuaZ inducement is not a necessary
element.8 7
The Bill does not apply when the FTC or a state agency has
jurisdiction; nor does it apply to
[aicts done by the publisher, owner, agent of employee
of a newspaper, periodical or radio or television station
in the publication or dissemination of an advertisement,
when the owner, agent or employee did not have knowl-
edge of the false, misleading or deceptive character of
the advertisement and did not have a direct financial
interest in the sale or distribution of the advertised
product or service.88
Under the "Little FTC Act," when a complaint is brought to
the attention of the Attorney General, he will first investigate
the complaint to determine if there has been a violation of the
act and also whether such complaint has sufficient public inter-
est for the Attorney General's office to proceed. Second, the
Attorney General will give the person accused of violating the
act notice that a complaint has been filed against him.89 The
give the businessman some sort of a guide to what act would be
considered to be unfair and deceptive.
Interview with John Bowen, Assistant Attorney General for the State of South
Carolina. See section 2(b) of the Bill; for a general discussion of the over
900 judicial interpretations given the language of the FTC Act, see Note,
Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1038-
63 (1967).
87. The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, H.2239, § 1(a)-(d)
(1970).
88. Id. § 3(b) provides: "The burden of proving exemption from the provi-
sions of the act shall be upon the person claiming the exemption."
89. Id. § 8 provides:
Service of any notice, demand or subpoena under this act shall
be made personally within this State, but if such cannot be ob-
tained, substituted service therefore may be made in the following
manner:
(a) Personal service thereof without this State; or
(b) The mailing thereof by registered or certified mail to the
last known place of business, residence or abode within or without
this State of such person for whom the same is intended; or
(c) In the manner provided by the laws of this State as if a
summons or other pleading which institutes a civil proceeding had
been filed; or
(d) Such service as a court of common pleas may direct in lieu
of personal service within this State.
1970]
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Attorney General would then contact the violator and ask him
to stop such unlawful or deceptive acts. If such a request were
to receive an affirmative response, a written assurance of vol-
untary compliance 0 would be accepted by the Attorney General,
and the case would be closed. Such assurance of voluntary com-
pliance would then be filed with and subject to the approval of
the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County.91 The assur-
ance of voluntary compliance would not be considered an admis-
sion of violation; however, any violation of the terms of such
assurance would constitute prima facie evidence of a violation of
the provisions of the act.
If an assurance of voluntary compliance cannot be obtained,
the attorney general may then proceed by way of injunction.92"
The injunctive action may be brought in the Court of Common
Pleas in the county in which such person resides or has his
principal place of business, or in the Court of Common Pleas
for Richland County.93 In this action the court may make such
additional orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore
to any injured person any moneys or property which may have
been lost by reason of the unlawful act or practice.94
At any time during these proceedings, subpoenas95 and investi-
90. Id. § 5 provides:
Such assurance may include a stipulation for the voluntary pay-
ment by such person of the cost of investigation, or of an amount
to be held in escrow pending the outcome of an action or as
restitution to aggrieved buyers, or both.
91. The assurance of voluntary compliance is filed in Richland County
because the Attorney General's Office is located in Richland County and
because it provides a centralized place to file them. Interview with John
Bowen, Assistant Attorney General.
92. The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, H.2239, § 4(a) (1970).
93. The action may be brought in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland
County so that a mobile scheme could be stopped by bringing only one action
and not one in every county. The injunction so obtained would apply through-
out the state. Interview with John Bowen, Assistant Attorney General.
94. The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, H2239, § 4(b), (1970).
95. Id. § 7 provides:
To accomplish the objectives and to carry out the duties pre-
scribed by this act, the Attorney General, in addition to other
powers conferred upon him by this act, may issue subpoenas to any
person, administer an oath or affirmation to any person, conduct
hearings in aid of any investigation or inquiry, prescribe such
forms and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be neces-
sary, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of
law: provided, however, that none of the powers conferred by this
act shall be used for the purpose of compelling any person to fur-
nish testimony or evidence which might tend to incriminate him or
subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; and provided, further, that
information obtained pursuant to the powers conferred by this act
shall not be made public or disclosed by the Attorney General or
[Vrol. 221
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss5/4
gative demands9" may be issued requiring persons to appear and
documents to be presented. These documents and the testimony
acquired by this act would not be applicable to any criminal
proceeding and would not be admissible as evidence in a criminal
prosecution.
9 7
If any person fails or refuses to answer any reasonable investi-
gative demand or subpoena, the court may be requested to grant
injunctive relief, vacate or suspend a corporate charter, or grant
such other relief as may be required. Any disobedience of any
final order entered by a court after a refusal to file any state-
ment or report, or obey any subpoena or investigative demand
issued by the Attorney General shall be punished as contempt.98
If a court finds that a person is employing unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the con-
duct of any trade or commerce, the Attorney General may re-
cover on behalf of the state a civil penalty not exceeding five
thousand dollars per violation.9 9 Further, any person who vio-
altes a permanent injunction under the Act may be required to
forfeit fifteen thousand dollars per violation. 0 0 This latter fine
is for violating the injunction and not for violating the terms of
the Act. Finally, upon petition and showing of good cause, the
court may order the forfeiture of a corporate charter or the
dissolution of the business.10 1
The proposed legislation also provides for a right of private
action to anyone who has suffered an ascertainable loss through
an unfair or deceptive practice. The person may recover his
actual damages or two hundred dollars, whichever is greater.
The Act futher provides that, upon a finding by the court of
a violation of the Act, the court shall award to the person bring-
ing such action reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 10 2 Also, if
the court finds that the employment of such unfair or deceptive
act was a willful or knowing violation, such court shall award
his employees beyond the extent necessary for law enforcement pur-
poses in the public interest.
The first provided clause was included in fear of violating the fifth amendment.
96. The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, H.2239, § 6(a) (1970).
An investigative demand may require a person to furnish, under oath, a report
in writing setting forth the relevant facts and circumstances of which he has
knowledge, or to appear and testify or to produce relevant documentary
material or physical evidence for examination.
97. The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, H2239, § 6 (1970).
98. Id. § 9.
99. Id. § 10(a).
100. Id. § 10(b).
101. Id. § 11.
102. Id. § 13(a) (emphasis added).
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triple damages.'03 This is an excellent section of the Act, because
it allows a consumer a private cause of action and a means by
which he can litigate a small claim without fear of expending
more on attorney's fees than he could recover in litigation.
This remedy, however, raises the proposition that consumers
will abuse the statute and the courts will be flooded with frivol-
ous claims of consumers. This fear can easily be abated by
emphasizing the fact that attorney's fees are recoverable by the
consumer only if he is successful in litigation. Consequently,
frivolous litigants will be paying their own attorney's fees, a fac-
tor which in itself should dissuade the individual from bringing
such claims. Furthermore, to be successful under the Act the con-
sumer must show that he has suffered an actual, ascertainable
loss of money or property as a result of an unfair or deceptive
practice. 04 Also, the provision awarding triple the actual dam-
ages comes into play only when either the violation was willful
or knowing, or the merchant knew or had reason to know that
the practice complained of was unfair or deceptive within the
meaning of section 2.105 Finally, the merchant is protected
against uncertainty in the law by an existing body of case law,
decisions by the FTC, and regulations by the Federal Trade
Commission.
Attorney General Consumer Protection Bureaus have been
criticised for spending too much time acting as a legal aid serv-
ice for individual consumers and not enough time organizing
industry-wide compliance programs or seeking meaningful
sanctions against major consumer law offenders. 106 This criti-
cism, however, would not be applicable in South Carolina, be-
cause the Act provides for an effective private remedy and thus
leaves the Attorney General's office free to pursue larger of-
fenders. Other questions have been raised concern the constitu-
tionality of the act and whether or not the Federal Trade Com-
mission has pre-empted the consumer law field. Since the
language of the FTC Act has been found constitutional, it is
assumed that no serious question would arise as to the constitu-
tionality of the South Carolina act. As to the question of pre-
emption, neither the language nor the legislative history of the
FTC Act and the subsequent amendments to it explicitly indi-
103. Id.
104. Id. §§ 4(b) and 13(a).
105. Id. § 13(a).
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cates whether Congress intended that this area be regulated
exclusively by federal authority.107 Furthermore, the FTC has
recommended that states adopt consumer legislation and has
gone so far as to draft a model act for the states to follow.108
VII. Co cvusIoN
The ever increasing number and type of deceptive business
practices requires that the state of South Carolina take immedi-
ate and effective action to prevent these schemes and protect the
innocent consumer. Other states have seen the need and have
filled the void by one of several consumer protection statutes.
The answer to this problem, however, does not lie in govern-
mental regulation of trade practices alone. One of the basic rea-
sons for the widespread use of deceptive and fraudulent prac-
tices is the gullibility and naivet6 of the consumer; therefore, the
goal of government should be education as well as legislation.10 9
The need for local consumer legislation is urgent. Responsible
legislation will not only enhance the image of the business com-
munity, but will provide the consumers of South Carolina with
the protection they need and deserve. Furthermore, the proposed
legislation will not overload the Attorney General's office with
individual complaints, because it provides a "self-help" method
whereby the consumer can protect himself. The Attorney Gen-
eral, consequently, can deal primarily with the larger, more
organized deceptive practices which would be difficult for the
individual consumer to challenge. The "South Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act," implemented by the Attorney General,
could effectively control and eventually eliminate the large scale
use of unfair and deceptive trade practices within the state of
South Carolina.
N. HYwAxR CLA oso N, HI
107. Double-Eagle Lubricants, Inc. v. Texas, 248 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Tex.),
appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 434 (1965).
108. See note 66 supra.
109. The Attorney General of South Carolina fully realizes the need for
educating the consumer and plans to initiate several consumer education pro-
grams as soon as the Consumer Protection bill is passed into law. Intervieiv
with John Bowen, Assistant Attorney General of the State of South Carolina.
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